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Abstract
I compare four basic monetary policy rules belonging to the interest-rate pegging rules class
in two di¤erent analystical frameworks representing the way through which nominal rigidities are
designed. A …rst model consider the Calvo-Woodford mechanism of price adjustment, as has become
customary in the literature on monetary policy rules. A second model, instead, considers the cost of
price adjustment function, as proposed by Rotemberg (1982). The two models are simulated to …nd
the optimal monetary policy rule, maximizing the welfare of the representative agent. The results
show that the optimal monetary policy rule for the model based on the Calvo price setting method
is a simple contemporaneous interest-pegging rule with a lagged nominal interest rate. However,
with a model based on the cost of price adjustment, the optimal rule is given by an interest rate rule
with a expected in‡ation, contemporaneous output gap and a lagged interes rate term as arguments.
Impulse respnse functions for di¤erent vallues of the parameters of the respective optimal monetary
poliy function are plotted for both models, for an expansionary public expenditure shock and a
contractionary monetary policy shock. The calculation of the model are empirically robust. For
the …rst time …scal policy is explicitly inserted in the model through a ’Passive’ tax policy rule. An
explicit analysi f about the determinacy of the equilibrium is contained in the model.
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1 Introduction
In the present paper I will explore how di¤erent hypothesis on the way through which nominal rigidities
enter into the model will a¤ect the search of an optimal monetary policy rule. In the literature the
workhorse model considered so far has been the work by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1998, 1999),
where nominal rigidities enter in the model through a simple price adjustment mechanism designed
according to Calvo (1983), where nominal price rigidity derives from the imperfect price adjustment done
by each …rm after a shock. This approach has several advantages. Probably, the more appealing feature
of this approach is given by his analytical simplicity which translates into the possibility of constructing
an aggregate supply function in terms of the expected in‡ation and output gap in a very intuitive way.
However, the main problem with this approach is represented by the fact that the instance of time revision
after a shock derives from an exogenous factor: the fraction of …rm adjusting prices in each period after
a shock is exogenously given and is not explicitly derived from an optimization problem.
Probably, a more rigorous approach would include an explicit optimization function of the price set
by each …rm under the hypothesis considered by Rotemberg (1982) and recently implemented in simple
Monetary Real Business Cycle model by Kim (2000). In the present paper I compare the performance of
monetary policy rules for two models: the …rst adopts the nominal rigidities along the Calvo approach,
while the other includes the price adjustment cost approach outlined by Rotemberg (1982) and Kim
(2000). The results show that the choice of nominal rigidities is not completely neutral with respect to
the optimality of monetary policy function. In fact, I have found that for a model with nominal rigidities
designed along the Calvo-Woodford approach, the optimal monetary policy rule is given by a Taylor-type
rule where nominal interest rate reacts to contemporaneous in‡ation output gap with a lagged interest
rate.
On the other hand, in a model with cost of price adjustment, the optimal monetary policy rule is
given by an interest-rate pegging rule with expected in‡ation, the contemporaneous output gap and a
lagged nominal interest rate, along the same lines proposed by Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1999). This
discrepancy is due to the explicit forward-looking character of the price setting mechanism characterizing
the price adjustment cost model. The forward looking character of the price setting mechanism introduces
a channel for the de…nition of the expected in‡ation term, which is included in the monetary policy rule.
A dissatisfactory aspect of the existing literature is given by the way in which money enters into
the model. In order to obtain sound welfare results, in the current litereature it is generally assumed
a strongly separable utility function in money, consumption and labor e¤ort. This approach has the
shortcoming of considering shocks to money demand as pure preference shocks, things which are di¢cult
to be empirically tested. A di¤erent approach instead, would insert money through transaction cost
approach. This is precisely the approach taken here: shocks to money demand can now be seen as
shocks to the transaction cost function, with a stronger empirical ‡avor than the preference approach.
Therefore, in this framework, the utility function will be additively separable in consumption an labor
e¤ort.
Another element of novelty given by the approach taken in this paper is given by the explicit con-
sideration of …scal policy: in the existing literature, …scal policy is assumed to be ‘Ricardian’, i.e. it
considers implicitly the existence of a solvency constraint on the government, as carefully discussed in
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and especially Woodford (2000). On the other hand, the present paper
takes explicitly into consideration the role of the government budget constraint into the model simulation
and solution and in the comparative evaluation of the various monetary policy rules.
As discussed by Cochrane (1998, 1999), Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) and Woodford (1996, 2000),
…scal policy requirements on the future path of the primary surpluses are a necessary complement to
the monetary policy rules in order to achieve full price stability. In the present model I assume a …scal
policy rule making taxes as reacting to the outstanding stock of real public debt. Such policy rule is
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de…ned ‘Passive’ in Leeper’s terminology, or ‘Ricardian’ in Woodford’s terminology, without any explicit
link with the notion of the Ricardian equivalence. This gives to the model an higher degree of generality.
The discussion on determinacy/indeterminacy of the Rational Expectation Equilibrium in dynamic
intertemporal models with monetary policy rules has been carefully considered by Woodford (2000) and
especially Bullard and Mitra (1999, 2000). The benchmark model adopted by the current literature
considers an Aggregate Supply function without real money balances - or nominal interest rate - via
the money demand expression derived from portfolio optimization of the representative agent. This is
mainly due to the particular approach adopted by those authors in setting up the role of money in these
models. In fact, with money inserted in an utility function strongly separable in all its arguments, it
is natural to derive an aggregate supply function completely independent upon monetary variables (real
money balances or nominal interest rate). Instead, the Aggregate Supply function derived in the present
model (where money enters via transaction costs in the Representative Agents’s budget constraint) turns
out to be dependent upon real money balances and the interest rate, adding a further dimension to the
various shocks of the model.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the reader is introduced to the common
elements of the two models, through the description of the demand side, together with the choice problems
(intertemporal and intratemporal) of the Representative Agent. In this section there is also a description
of the government’s role and of the equilibrium of the overall economy. The following section starts with
the description of the supply side for both models: I start …rst with the model based on Calvo (1983) and
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). The model based on the Cost of Price Adjustment à la Rotemberg
(1982) - Kim (2000) will follow. Monetary policy rules employed in the simulations are described in a
new section, followed by a discussion on the calibration of the parameters of the model. The discussion
on the optimal monetary policy function is preceded by a section on the conditions to be respected
by the monetary policy reaction function parameters in order to achieve determinacy of the Rational
Expectation Equilibrium. Then, the welfare analysis with the search for the optimal monetary policy
function will follow together with a discussion on the goodness of …t of the models simulated with the
parameter con…gurations for their respective optimal monetary policy function. Finally, the analysis of
the impulse-response function for the two models closes the presentation of results. A section with …nal
comments ends the paper.
2 The demand side
2.1 The intertemporal and intra-temporal consumer’s problem.
In what follows I am going to describe the common features of the models used for the evaluation
of monetary policy functions. The economy is populated by a large number of representative agents
indexed by j on the real line between 0 and 1, each of them will maximize the following stream of utility
discounted with a rate ¯, 0 < ¯ < 1; depending only upon consumption Cjt and the work e¤ort L
j
t :
Ujt = E0
1X
t=0
¯tu
³
Cjt ; L
j
t
´
(1)
The instantaneous utility function u
³
Cjt ; L
j
t
´
is given by:
u
³
Cjt ; L
j
t
´
=
³
Cjt
´1¡ 1¾
1¡ 1¾
¡
³
Ljt
´1+ 1´
1 + 1´
(2)
with ¾ > 1, and ´ > 1: In (2) I assumed a strongly separable utility function in consumption and
labor e¤ort. This can be a strong limitation for dynamic models like that considered here. However,
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the utility function above considered avoids nonsensical welfare calculations because it does not show
the cross substitution e¤ect between Cjt and L
j
t . This utility function is very close to the special case
considered in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), and Woodford (1999), apart from the absence of real
money balances.
The representative agent maximizes the utility function (1) ¡ (2) subjected to the following budget
constraint:
Z 1
0
pt(i)C
j
t (i)
h
1 + »jtf
³
V jt
´i
di+Bjt +M
j
t = (1 + it¡1)B
j
t¡1 +M
j
t¡1 +w
j
tL
j
t + Pt­
j
t ¡ PtT jt (3)
As in the traditional models of monopolistic competition, I consider the existence of a continuous set
of goods indexed by i on the real line between 0 and 1. Under this view, the variable Cjt is an index
of all the goods produced in this economy. In the formulation under (3) for the representative agent
budget constraint, I assume that the wealth of the agent is given by nominal bonds and money. In the
resources available for consumption are given by interest earned on government bonds1, (1 + it¡1)B
j
t¡1,
moneyM jt , labor income w
j
tL
j
t and nominal pro…ts Pt­
j
t . The decision to consume is costly for the agent
since a fraction of its resources is spent in the transaction technology f
³
V jt (i)
´
, where V jt is the velocity
of money for agent j. V jt is de…ned as follows:
V jt =
PtM
j
t
Cjt
(4)
where Cjt is the aggregate demand expressed on all goods by agent j, and Pt is the general price index.
I consider here a very simple formulation for the velocity function, as in Sims (1994). In fact, f
³
V jt
´
is
assumed to be linear and it is given by: f
³
V jt
´
= V jt . This is done in order to keep calculations simple
and to provide a set of results for a model which can be considered as a possible benchmark, open to
further extensions.
In the above formulation, »jt is a transaction cost parameter and represents the size of the total
transaction cost that has to be paid by the single agent in each consumption transaction.
To allow for money demand shocks I assume a stochastic behavior for »jt , which can be represented
with an AR(1) process, as follows:
log
³
»jt
´
= +
¡
1¡ ½»
¢
log
¡
»j
¢
+ ½» log
³
»jt¡1
´
+ "»t (5)
with E
³
"»t
´
= 0; V ar
³
"»t
´
= ¾2» .
I …nd this way of modelling money demand shocks more realistic than a more standard approach with
money in the utility function where money demand shocks are identi…ed as preference shocks.
In (5) and in all the equations which will follow, »j without time subscript indicates the steady state
values of »jt : From (3) we also see that the government levies lump-sum taxes on the representative agent
in the amount of T jt .
The intertemporal maximization problem faced by each representative agent is a portfolio allocation
problem. In fact, each agent optimizes his (her) utility function with respect to Cjt , L
j
t , M
j
t , and B
j
t , to
1 In the notation of the text, Bjt , indicates the bonds held by agent j. In the same way, M
j
t is the money holding agent
j.
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produce the following set of …rst order conditions:³
Cjt
´¡ 1¾
= ¸jt
³
1 + 2»jtV
j
t
´
(6)³
Ljt
´ 1
´
= ¸jt
W jt
Pt
(7)
¯Et
¸jt+1
Pt+1
=
¸jt
Pt
·
1¡ »jt
³
V jt
´2¸
(8)
¯ (1 + it)Et
¸jt+1
Pt+1
=
¸jt
Pt
(9)
where ¸jt is the Lagrange Multiplier associated to the constraint of the j-th agent. Equation (6)
indicates the intertemporal choice of consumption, while equation (7) represents the optimal choice of
labor by equating the disutility of the work e¤ort to the real wage weighted by the marginal utility of
consumption. Equation (8) indicates the optimal choice of money and together with (9) nests a money
demand function. Equation (9), …nally is the results from optimal bond allocation. Attached to (6)¡(9)
there is also a Transversality Condition on Government bond holdings in order to avoid a Ponzi Scheme
with public debt.
The optimization process so far described pertains to the intertemporal dimension of the choice
problem faced by each representative agent. However, given the presence of a large number of …nal
goods, each agent chooses also the composition of a basket of di¤erentiated goods. On this ground, the
variable Cjt represents an index of all the di¤erentiated goods produced in this economy.
Thus, following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) the basket Cjt is formed by aggregating through a CES
aggregator all the i 2 [0; 1] …nal goods as:
Cjt =
·Z 1
0
³
Cjt (i)
´ µ¡1
µ
¸ µ
µ¡1
(10)
where µ > 1, indicates the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent …nal goods varieties. Let Xjt be
the total expenditure of agent j. In order to decide the optimal allocation among di¤erentiated goods,
each agent j maximizes the index (10) over Cjt (i) for all i 2 [0; 1] subjected to the following constraint:Z 1
0
pt(i)C
j
t (i)di · Xjt (11)
The solution to the intra-temporal program delivers the following expression for the aggregate price index
Pt:
Pt =
·Z 1
0
pt(i)
1¡µdi
¸ 1
1¡µ
(12)
Also, the demand for each good i expressed by every agent j is:
Cjt (i)
Cjt
=
·
pt(i)
Pt
¸¡µ
(13)
where µ is the elasticity of good i with respect to its price.
Combining the above relations, we …nd that the total expenditure of each agent is given by:
Xjt = PtC
j
t
In the present framework we need the di¤erentiated goods assumptions in order to introduce an imper-
fectly competitive market for each di¤erent quality of goods and a consequent price control by each …rm
i producing each variety i.
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2.2 Government and Fiscal Policy
The government budget constraint in nominal terms is given by:
Bt ¡ (1 + it¡1)Bt¡1 +Mt ¡Mt¡1 = PtGt ¡ PtTt (14)
In equation (14) the primary de…cit (surplus) Gt¡Tt plus the interest rate proceedings paid by Govern-
ment to the owner of government debt it¡1Bt¡1 is …nanced either by printing new money Mt ¡Mt¡1
or by issuing new debt Bt ¡ Bt¡1. Despite the limited role of seignorage revenue in all the advanced
economy, I have chosen to include money as a source of debt …nancing more for comparison matters with
the existing literature than for a theoretical reason.
Of course, the equilibrium conditions on both debt and money market are such that demand meets
supply at any instant t, so that the total amount of debt and money ‡oating in the market are entirely
owned by j-th households. In fact:
Bt =
Z 1
0
Bjt dj, Mt =
Z 1
0
M jt dj, and Tt =
Z 1
0
T jt dj (15)
The comparative evaluation of alternative monetary policy rules cannot be considered without con-
straints on the solvency of government. As pointed out by an important stream of literature known as
‘Fiscal Theory of the Price Level’, in order to avoid unpleasant episodes of in‡ation due to loose bud-
getary policies, we need to impose a set of restrictions on the …scal revenue collected by the government.
In this sense, by imposing a set of equilibrium …scal policies which force the government to set the total
amount of …scal revenue (or the primary surplus, more directly) as a function of the outstanding stock
of real debt, will avoid the risk of in‡ationary expectations.
As pointed out by Sims (1994, 1998), Cochrane (1998, 1999), and Woodford (2000), the in‡ation can
be viewed as …scal phenomenon: if the government is perceived of adopting a loose …scal policy, the
in‡ation rate will explode right from today, discounting the future increase of money supply needed to
wash out the level of outstanding debt. This is an equilibrium phenomena: it will happen in expectation
even if seignorage revenue are very small and the commitment to avoid the use of them in …nancing the
debt is very strong from the government’s side.
Thus, in order to prevent an explosive solution for price level, Leeper (1991), and Sims (1994) de…ne
an ‘active’ …scal policy as one which makes taxes reacting to real debt as follows:
Tt = Ã0 + Ã1
Bt¡1
Pt
(16)
with ¯ (1 + i) > Ã1 in order to assure stability of the debt path. It is possible to design also alternative
policy rules belonging to the same family of rule (16). For example, Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (1997)
describe balanced-budget rules. In general, a set of ‘passive’ …scal policies (or alternatively said ‘Ricar-
dian’ …scal policies, in the Woodford’s (1996, 2000) jeargon) are such that make taxes reacting to the
outstanding stock of public debt.
In what follows, I assume that in the comparative evaluation of various monetary policy rules the
government adopt a rule like (16). This will allow us to concentrate on the parameter combination of
monetary policy rules which will satisfy certain requirements both in terms of determinacy/indeterminacy
of the solution of the Rational Expectation (henceforth RE) equilibirum model and in terms of welfare
optimality.
I assume that the pure public expenditure (net of interest payment) G follows an AR(1) process, given
by
log (Gt) = (1¡ ½G) logG+ ½G log (Gt¡1) + "Gt+1 (17)
with "Gt+1 i.i.d. variable normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance, ¾
2
G.
6
2.3 The equilibrium of the demand side
In what follows, I will introduce a crucial assumption: I will concentrate on a symmetric equilibrium
where the choices made by each agent j is the same across all agents of the population. This will allow
to drop index j from the equations of the model.
By manipulating the …rst Order Conditions (8) and (9), we get that money demand is given by:
mt =
·
»t
µ
1 + it
it
¶¸1=2
Ct (18)
where mt =Mt=Pt indicate real money balances. Equation (18) is a traditional money demand function.
In fact, it is straightforward to verify that @mt@Ct > 0;
@mt
@it
< 0. Additionally, shocks to money demand are
transaction cost shock and hit mt a pure multiplicative way through the function »t. This is realistic
description of money demand ‡uctuations. In fact, given the increased role of transaction cost shocks in
the ‡uctuations in money demand recently observed in the money market of the most advanced economy.
Mixing together equations (6) and (7) we have that the labor supply curve for all agent j is given by:
L
1
´
t =
C
¡ 1¾
t
1 + 2»tVt
µ
Wt
Pt
¶
(19)
The labor supply function (19) is positively sloped with respect to wage, but negatively sloped with
respect to consumption through the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor e¤ort.
Given the existence of lump sum taxation, the representative agent’s budget constraint can be rewrit-
ten as:
Ct
µ
1 + »t
Ct
mt
¶
= Yt ¡Gt (20)
According to equation (20) the amount of income net of public expenditure can only be consumed. In
this model, I did not include investment, in order to keep the analysis as simple as possible. A fraction
of income is given up in order to …nance the transaction costs.
Finally, after combining (6) with (9) we get the Euler equation as follows:
C
¡ 1¾
t³
1 + 2»t
Ct
mt
´ = ¯ (1 + it)Et C¡ 1¾t+1
¼t+1
³
1 + 2»t+1
Ct+1
mt+1
´ (21)
where ¼t+1 = Pt+1=Pt is the in‡ation rate.
From equations (18)-(21), it is easy to get the steady state of the model. To solve the model I will
take a lig …rst-order Taylor expansion around the steady state of each variable (expressed in logs).
For further reference, I will report here the loglinearized version of some of the previous relationships.
From (6), (7), (9), respectively, we get:
e¸
t = ¡´c¸ect + ´m¸ ³emt ¡ e»t´ (22)
eLt = ´e¸t + ´ ( ewt ¡ ept) (23)
´cect + e¼t ¡ ´m ³emt ¡ e»t´ = ´cect¡1 ¡ ´m ³emt¡1 ¡ e»t¡1´+ ´ieit¡1 (24)
Additionally, the money demand function and the representative agent’s budget constraint are respec-
tively given by:
emt = 1
2
e»t + ect + ´ieit (25)
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ect = ´cyeyt ¡ ´cg eGt + ´cm ³emt ¡ e»t´ (26)
These equations expressed in log-linear terms, will be employed to get a reduced form of the aggregate
supply equation curve.
3 The model based on Calvo (1983) price setting mechanism
In what follows I will introduce the reader to the pro…t maximization problem considered by each …rm
living in a world where the Calvo (1983) approach of price setting, modi…ed along Woodford (1996) and
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) is the only source of nominal rigidity in the model.
The …rm producing good i faces two types of choices about the price of good i to be charged to
consumers and about the amount of work to hire.
The framework I am going to follow is based on a monopolistic competition framework close to the
model of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). Each …rm is free to determine a price for each period in order
to maximize its own pro…t. An additional feature of my model is represented by the inclusion of a …xed
cost shock © in the production function , on the same lines highlighted by Hornstein (1993) and Kim
(1996). This cost can be interpreted as a sort of entry barrier that each …rm has to cross before entering
in a given market. The advantage of this formulation is that it allows to have zero pro…ts in the steady
state.
According to Calvo (1983) model of price determination, each seller sets a new price with probability
1 ¡ ± (0 < ± < 1) each period independently of the time passed since the last price change. Thus, ±
measures the degree of nominal rigidity. I adopt this framework as a …rst approximation in order to
make my model comparable with the existing literature. In fact, Woodford (1996) and Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) who study the role of monetary and …scal policy rules in model like the present one,
adopt the same framework with a di¤erent utility function. By following this way, in fact, I can compare
more easily how the way through which money enters in the model can be crucial or not in the evaluation
of …scal and monetary policy rules. A more realistic approach for the modelling of price rigidities is
considered in the next section where I will examine a model with cost of adjusting prices.
What are the advantages of a Calvo price setting formulation ? First of all, we obtain a model with
one parameter which allows for arbitrary variation in average time until price changes between zero
and in…nity. In fact, this will help to derive an equation where the deviation of actual output from its
potential level will be transferred into an higher expected in‡ation next period, exactly like an Aggregate
Supply curve of an undergraduate-level macroeconomic textbook.
The second advantage of this formulation is that if the probability of price changes is independent
of time since the last price change, we do not need to consider how existing prices vary with the age of
price commitments. Although this framework cannot be considered entirely realistic, it allows an easy
derivation of the AS curve, which makes the model more comparable with the existing literature.
Before we get into the model, let us consider the evolution of the price index Pt. De…ne with Pt the
price chosen by each single …rm at date t: Pt identi…es the new price set by each seller at date t. Each of
the previous prices appear in the new price distribution with ± times the previous frequency. Therefore,
the price index can be written as:
P 1¡µt =
·Z 1
0
pt(i)
1¡µdi
¸
= (27)
= (1¡ ±)P(1¡µ)t + ±
Z 1
0
pt¡1(i)1¡µ =
= (1¡ ±)P(1¡µ)t + ±P 1¡µt¡1 (28)
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The choice of Pt depends only upon the current and expected fut............ure evolution of fPtg: we do
not need to keep track of the entire price distribution, across all producers.
The production function for good i is assumed to be:
Yt(i) = At (Lt(j))
(1¡®) ¡ ¡©t (29)
In (29) I assume that the economy shows a constant gross growth rate of income of ¡ ¸ 1 and that the
variables appearing in this framework are already transformed according to it. At is the technology
process and ©t is the …xed cost shock. I assume that both At and ©t are common to all …rms and follow
the stochastic processes:
log (At) = ½A log (At¡1) + (1¡ ½A) log (A) + "At (30)
log (©t) = ½© log (©t¡1) + (1¡ ½©) log (©) + "©t (31)
where A (¸ 0) and ©(¸ 0) are the steady state values and "At and "©t are i.i.d. random variables normally
distributed with N(0; ¾2A), N(0; ¾
2
©), respectively. The …xed cost shock can be interpreted also as an
additional type of technological shock which enters additively in the production function. A possible
further interpretation considers ©t as a set up shop cost, i.e. a cost that has to be pad by each …rm in
order to start up with the business.
Each …rm chooses its own price Pt in order to maximize the following pro…ts function:
max
Pt
1X
s=0
(±¯)s ¸jt+s
"µ
Pt
Pt+s
¶
Yt(i)¡ w
j
t
Pt
Ljt
#
(32)
The total demand faced by each …rm i is the sum of the total demand of goods expressed both from the
consumers’ side and from the government’s side. Therefore, according to (13) we can rewrite the demand
for each single …rm as follows:
Yt(i)
Yt
=
·
pt(i)
Pt
¸¡µ
(33)
In the maximization process of equation (32), I exploited the demand of …nal goods (33), the production
function (29) for Ljt , the …rst order condition on Ct (6) to get ¸
j
t+s for all j, and the …rst order condition
on Ljt , (7), to get
wjt
Pt
. Thus, having solved the optimization problem (32), I log-linearize the resulting
expression with respect to all the variables to get the following expression:
Et
1X
i=0
(±¯)i
h ePt;t+i ¡ Ásyeyt+i + Ás¸e¸t+i + ÁsA eAt+i ¡ Ás©e©t+ii = 0 (34)
In (34) ePt;t+s indicates the price set at time t to hold at time t + s and Ásy, ÁsA, Ás©; Ás¸ are
coe¢cients function of the core parameters whose expressions are given in the appendix. Moreover, eXt+i
indicates the di¤erence logXt+i ¡ logX, with X steady state, for each variable. Equation (34) is the
starting point from which we can derive an aggregate supply function. To do so, we need to log-linearize
(28) around the steady state to obtain:
e¼t = 1¡ ±
±
ePt;t (35)
where e¼t is the gross in‡ation rate. It is also easy to get the following important relation:
ePt;t+s = ePt;t ¡ sX
i=1
e¼t+i
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which in virtue of (35) becomes
ePt;t+s = ±
1¡ ± e¼t ¡
sX
i=1
e¼t+i (36)
after having used (35). If we de…ne now
eDt+i = Ásyeyt+i ¡ Ás¸e¸t+i ¡ ÁsA eAt+i + Ás©e©t+i (37)
After making use of (36), we can rewrite (34) as follows:
Et
1X
i=0
(±¯x)
i
"
±
1¡ ± e¼t ¡
sX
i=1
e¼t+i# = Et 1X
i=0
(±¯x)
i eDt+i
Solving for the summation terms, we …nally get:
e¼t = (1¡ ±) (1¡ ±¯x)
±
eDt + ¯Ete¼t+1 (38)
A …nal transformation involves the elements included in eDt. From the log-linearized version of the FOC
(22), (23) and (24), solve for e¸t; emt and ect as functions of the actual output eyt, the public expenditure
shock eGt, the transaction cost shock e»t and the nominal interest rate eit. Then, if we plug the resulting
expression in the de…nition of eDt given by (37) and rearrange, we get the following expression for the
aggregate supply function:
¯Ete¼t+1 = e¼t ¡ ´syeyt + ´s»e»t + ´sA eAt ¡ ´s©e©t + ´sG eGt + ´sieit (39)
with ´sy, ´s», ´sA, ´s©, ´sG function of the core parameters of the model. From equation (39) we can
also de…ne the level of potential output as eyPt = ¡´sA´sy eAt ¡ ´s»´sye»t + ´s©´sy e©t ¡ ´sG´Ásy eGt so that we can have
the following expression for the aggregate supply function:
¯Ete¼t+1 = e¼t ¡ ´sy ¡eyPt ¡ eyt¢+ ´sieit (40)
which is a traditional aggregate supply curve. When eyt > eyst the economy is subjected to an in‡ationary
pressure. This an AS formulation similar to what has been proposed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997,
1998, 1999). If we de…ne the output gap as
ext = eyPt ¡ eyt (41)
the aggregate supply curve to be employed for the analysis of the results is given by:
¯Ete¼t+1 = e¼t ¡ ´syext + ´sieit (42)
A crucial feature of the AS curve represented by equation (42) is given by the presence of nominal interest
rate. This can be explained by recalling the fact that the Lagrange multiplier from (6) and (22) is a
function of real money balances, so that in solving the model for e¸t; emt and ect as functions of eyt, eGt, e»t
we get nominal interest rate in the AS equation.
This is a consequence of the speci…c way in which money enters in the model. This result is di¤erent
from what has been obtained by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1998, 1999) and Woodford (2000),
where the AS curve was independent upon real money balances and nominal interest rate. Here, instead,
Euler equation - through the de…nition of Lagrange multiplier ¸ (which includes real money balances) -
directly depends upon m, so it is AS, after the proper transformations described above2.
2 The same result would have been obtained in a model with an utility function weakly separable in consumption and
real money balances, as f.e. in Kim (2000), and Lubik (2000), within a di¤erent context.
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An AS curve independent upon real money balances can only be obtained if the utility function of the
representative agent is strongly separable in all its arguments: consumption, labor e¤ort and real money
balances. It is known, however, as discussed by Sims (2000), that such an utility function is highly
problematic in dynamical models, for the lack of intertemporal crossed e¤ects between all its arguments.
With strong separability we loose the dimension of a true intertemporal problem. Even if the strong
separable utility function (with money as argument) is widely employed in the literature, I think that
the inclusion of money through transaction costs and the functional form assumed in (2) are the best
compromise in terms of generality, allowing also to obtain accurate welfare calculations.
4 The model with price adjustment costs
A source of dissatisfaction in the modern monetary literature, is the way through which rigidities are
modelled. The biggest shortcoming of the Calvo-Woodford approach to nominal rigidity modelling is
given by the fact that the distribution of price change is exogenous, as well as it is the time between two
subsequent price changes.
A remedy to this problem can be o¤ered by a model where prices are costly to change like that
described in Kim (1996). Basically the cost of adjusting prices is assumed to be:
ACPt =
ÁP
2
µ
Pt (j)
Pt¡1 (j)
¡ ¼
¶2
Yt (43)
where ¼ is the steady state in‡ation rate, and ÁP is the adjustment cost parameter.
To explore the consequences of adopting such formulation with respect to the Calvo-Woodford ap-
proach I consider here a modelling framework similar to what has been shown before, apart from the
function of price adjustment cost which is now given by (43) in place of (28).
As before, I conduct the same kind of exercise by evaluating di¤erent monetary and …scal policy rules.
Therefore, the basic structure of the model (monetary and …scal policy rules, transaction costs, technology
shocks, production function) does not change, apart from the di¤erent function of price adjustment (43).
In this case, the optimization problem of the …rm becomes dynamic and not static. In (43) I set
¼ = 1, as in the traditional menu cost approach inaugurated by Rotemberg (1982). Therefore, according
to (43) a …rm pays a cost in terms of output all the time she decides to change prices. In a more general
case, followed for example by Kim (2000), when ¼ 6= 1, each …rm would pay a cost only when the growth
rate of prices di¤ers form the steady state level of the gross in‡ation rate ¼.
The rationale behind the formulation adopted here stays in the fact that people formulates their
plans according to a stable level of in‡ation rate. If these plans are compatible with this in‡ation rate,
we do not observe any deviations from rationality. This ways of modelling rigidity can be interpreted
as a synthetic way to represent the complex nexus of relationships existing between each …rm and her
customer.
4.1 Pro…t Maximization
The optimal choice of productive input and prices is done by each …rm through the maximization of
the future stream of pro…t evaluated with a stochastic pricing kernel ½t for contingent claims, which I
consider here as the …rm’s discount factor. Each …rm maximizes the future stream of pro…ts:
max
fKt(j);Lt(j)g
E0
" 1X
t=0
½t­t (j)
#
(44)
subjected to:
­t (j) = Pt (j)Yt (j)¡WtLt (j)¡ PtACPt (j) (45)
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given the demand for di¤erentiated (33), and the cost of price adjustment function (43), after having
aggregated over all i 2 [0; 1] agents.
In taking …rst-order conditions for problem (44)-(45), I am going to use the relationship existing
between Yt (j) and Lt (j) through the production function. The …rst order condition with respect to the
unique input of the production function Lt (j) is given by:
Wt
Pt
= (1¡ ®)
µ
1¡ 1
"t (j)
¶µ
Yt (j) + ©tG
t
Lt (j)
¶µ
Pt (j)
Pt
¶
(46)
where "t (j) is the demand elasticity, whose expression is given by:
1
"t (j)
=
1
µ
½
1¡ Áp
·
Pt (j)
Pt¡1 (j)
¡ 1
¸
Pt
Pt¡1 (j)
Yt
Yt (j)
+Et
·
Áp
½t+1
½t
µ
Pt+1 (j)
Pt (j)
¡ 1
¶
Pt+1
Pt (j)
Pt+1 (j)
Pt (j)
Yt+1
Yt (j)
¸¾
(47)
Equation (47) measures the gross markup of price over marginal costs. In fact, if Áp = 0 (in a perfectly
‡exible price framework), the markup over the costs, would be just µµ¡1 over marginal cost given by
equation (46). On the other hand, when µ ! 1 and Áp = 0 the markup will be constant and equal
to one, since all goods produced by atomistic …rms would be perfectly substitutable and market power
would have disappeared. In fact, with an explicit design of the full intertemporal problem in the pro…t
maximization process, both technology and the demand shocks a¤ect the magnitude and the cyclical
properties of the markup, which now becomes one of the key channels of transmission of the various
policy shocks. For example, with a positive demand shock, …rms will be forced to cut the markup: in
fact, given the increase of the marginal revenue, output increases, but prices will increase less than in
the full ‡exible case, leading to the cut of the markup. I consider these features as extremely important
especially for the comparative evaluation of alternative monetary policy rules.
4.2 Additional Features
An important aspect for the characterization of the equilibrium of the model is given by role of the
intertemporal discount factor for both …rms and consumers. In the present context, I assume that each
agent (consumers and …rms) have access to a set of complete markets for contingent claims. This implies
the existence of a unique market discount factor, as a consequence of adding the following condition:
½t+1
½t
=
¯¸t+1
¸t
(48)
To understand condition (48) we can imagine the presence of a representative agent who can freely
exchange shares of each …rm operations in this economy, without paying transaction costs at all. It is
clear, however, that the introduction of an additional …rst order condition for the optimal shares allocation
will produce the same results.
Working through the …rst order conditions of the intertemporal choice problem of the consumers
and through those by the …rm, it is easy to show that even the model with cost of price adjustment
nests an Aggregate Supply curve of the same type of that derived from the model with Calvo-Woodford
mechanism of price adjustment. To see this, let impose the symmetrical equilibrium condition by on all
the equations of the system together with (46) and (47), by setting Xt (j) = Xt. Then, loglinearize3 the
resulting expression around the steady state we get the following version of equations (46) and (47):
fWt ¡ ePt = ´yeyt + ¡1¡ ´y¢ e©t + (µ ¡ 1)¡1e"t (49)
3Recall that in the loglinearization of (47) I considered a steady state level of the in‡ation rate equal to 1.
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¯ÁpEte¼t+1 = ÁpEte¼t ¡e"t (50)
with ´y ´ (1¡ ®)
¡
1¡ 1µ
¢
. Thus, by using the same set of …rst order conditions, together with equations
(49) and (50), we get a similar AS curve as that obtained in (42).
5 Monetary Policy Rules
Throughout the paper I will consider alternative monetary policy rules whose behavior has been carefully
studied in a both theoretical and applied works. All the following rules are expressed in log-linear form.
All the rules considered in the present paper have been obtained as variants of the following general
interest-rate pegging rule:
it = i+
TiX
n=1
Áin (it¡1 ¡ i) +
T¼X
n=1
Á¼n (¼t¡1 ¡ ¼) +
TxX
n=1
Áxn (Yt¡1 ¡ Y ) + ´mpt (51)
where it is a measure of the nominal interest rate (the Federal Funds Rate in the empirical literature),
with steady state i, and ¼t = Pt=Pt¡1 as gross in‡ation rate with steady state ¼. Additionally, Yt
indicates the level of actual output. In (51) I assumed that the target of the monetary policy authority
for the nominal interest rate, in‡ation and output is coincident with the steady state level of these
variables. The advantage of making use of rules embedded in (51) is mainly given by the restrict number
of parameters to be controlled by monetary policy authority. Under rules like (51), money supply
becomes endogenous, since monetary authority sets interest rate by letting the quantity of money to be
determined endogenously by market clearing conditions in the money market.
In equation (53) I also included a monetary policy shock ´mpt for which I assumed an AR(1) structure
like the following:
log (´mpt ) =
¡
1¡ ½mp
¢
log (´mp) + ½mp log
¡
´mpt¡1
¢
+ "mpt (52)
where "mpt is an i.i.d. process distributed as follows "
mp
t » N
¡
0; ¾2mp
¢
. This assumption adds a little
more persistency in the model, in order to allow a better propagation mechanism internal to the model,
as suggested by Furher and Moore (1995b) and Cogley and Nason (1995a,b).
One key element of the present model is the role of various shocks: the …xed cost shock in the
production function and the transaction cost shock which do not disappear in steady state. It should
be noted that all these elements make the output gap - intended as the di¤erence between actual and
potential output - as time varying. Moreover, in the model based on the cost of price adjustment, the
markup is not constant over the marginal cost, but is time varying, as shown in both equations (46)-
(47). It has been shown that an accurate way to insert the targeting of real variables from the monetary
authority is to explicitly consider the output gap variable ext, de…ned in equation (41).
Note that given the characteristics of the model at hands, the output gap derived fro mthis model
is not necessarily e¢cient. In fact, if for e¢cient output gap we mean a level of output where all the
frictions (both nominal and real) were eliminated, this is not the case considered here, because of the
presence of the money transaction costs.
Thus, for potential output we mean the level of output associated to an economy where all nominal
rigidities (here price rigidities) are completely absent from the model. It is natural, then, for monetary
authority to target - together with the in‡ation rate - also the output gap.
Therefore, the simplest Taylor Rule assumed in the literature, which I consider here as a benchmark,
is what I will call the Taylor Rule 1:
eit = Á¼e¼t + Áxext + ´mpt (53)
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where ´mpt has been de…ned in (52). According to rule (53), monetary authority sets interest rate reaction
to in‡ationary pressure and to movements of the level of output gap. This rule is similar to what has
been proposed by Taylor (1993), where nominal interest rate were assumed to react to in‡ation and actual
output (note: note the output gap), with …xed parameters Á¼ = 1:5, Áx = 0:5.
A particular case for this rule is given by the simple interest rate pegging rule with the in‡ation rate
assumed as unique target, by setting Áx = 0: this is the rule described by Leeper (1991) and called
‘active’ monetary policy.
A recent stream of literature stresses the importance of inertial behavior of the nominal interest rate.
Woodford (1999), and Svensson and Woodford (1999) have pointed out that changes in nominal interest
rates through open market operations or movemntes in the free reserve accounts, never happen to be a
sudden and unexpected phenomena. In fact, often the changes of the discount rate have been preceded
by persistent movements in Federal Funds Rate (in US, f.e.). This is done in order to avoid exaggerated
reactions from …nancial markets and minimize the distortions on the portfolio reallocation issues.
Thus, the inclusion of a lagged nominal interest rate, in equation (53) will generate what we call
Taylor Rule 2:
eit = Á¼e¼t + Áxext + Áieit¡1 (54)
It should be noted that in order to make both rules (53) and (54) operational, we need to specify the
frequency at which data are collected by monetary authority at the decision time. This is not irrelevant
especially when we consider that both (53) and (54) require the contemporaneous knowledge of current
data about output gap (i.e. actual output, potential output) and in‡ation rate. However, in many
situations, these data are collected retrospectively.
To take into account these criticism, I de…ne a new policy rule, called Taylor Rule 3, given by the
following equation:
eit = Á¼e¼t¡1 + Áxext¡1 + Áieit¡1 (55)
The adoption of a rule like (55) with lagged data can be justi…ed by conisdering also a policy imple-
mentation lag, linked to the monetary authority reaction to particular kind of shocks.
Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1999) showed as all rules (53)-(55), can be derived from a general class
of rules where the target of the monetary authority is given by the expected in‡ation, together with
a contemporaneous value of the output gap and a lagged nominal interest rate. The same authors
estimated a similar rule for the US economy over a prede…ned sample and support their choice with the
good model …t provided by this type of rule. Thus, by inserting an expected in‡ation term into equation
(53) we get the following Taylor Rule 4:
eit = Á¼Ete¼t+1 + Áxext + Áieit¡1 (56)
Monetary policy rules (53)-(56) have been also considered by McCallum and Nelson (1998) in model
di¤erent from this presented here, without considering the joint design of …scal policy rule along the
lines proposed by equations (??) and (16). In the evaluation of monetary policy rules proposed in the
literature, this aspect has been taken as given, by simply assuming that …scal policy follows a ‘Ricardian’
or ‘Passive’ rule such as (16). Here, instead, for the …rst time this aspect is explicitly taken into account
in the empirical evaluation of the model.
6 Calibration
Common Features
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The parameter choice is realized according to the most important contributions of the existing lit-
erature on monetary RBC models, in order to make the results here presented highly comparable. In
particular, for the de…nitions of the parameters common to both models - i.e. the ‘core’ parameters - I
will make extensive reference to those models in the literature which have been estimated or appear to
be very robust with respect to the parameter’s choice. The key parameters of the model common to
both approaches (Calvo-Woodford rigidity approach and Cost of Price Adjustment) are reported in the
following Table 1:
Parameter Value
¯ 0.9839
® 0.33
¾ 0.5
¡ 1.004
µ 6
» .00532
´ 3.56
Ã1 0.55
Table 1
In most cases, the choices made here indicate widely accepted parameters. To calibrate the discount
rate of the representative agent in the transformed economy, recall the steady state relationship existing
between nominal and real interest rates: 1+i¼ = ¯
¡1. From data collected on US economy on a quarterly
basis for the sample 1959:1-1999:4, we record a value for the gross nominal rate equal to 1.0163% (1.067%
on annual basis). Thus, if we set the in‡ation rate equal to 1, as it has been done for example, in
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), we get a value for ¯ as that reported in the above table. The choice
of parameter ® implies a share of labor’s income equal to 0.67 as in Campbell (1994). Recall that ¡
indicates the growth rate of stationary variables of the overall economy, and it is set equal to 1.004 as
in King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988). The elasticity of substitution is always a delicate parameter to be
pinned down. I have chosen a value for ¾ equal to 0.5, implying a degree of risk aversion equal to 2, as
prescribed by a well consolidated RBC literature.
Parameter µ describes the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods. It is set equal to 6,
in order to generate a level of markup equal to 1.2.
Another crucial parameter is given by the transaction cost given by »: to calibrate this parameter
I followed Leeper and Sims (1994). For what concerns the role of the intertemporal substitution of the
labor e¤ort, I set ´ equal to 3.76, in order to guarantee internal coherence of the model. This is not too
far from 3.56 - a value assumed by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1999) in a model with a similar utility
function.
For what concerns …scal policy parameter Ã1 the current empirical literature does not provide any
sort of help about the magnitude of this parameter. It is clear, that to make economic sense within the
present context, has to be positive (strictly). Sims (1994) indicated a bound that has to be respected
by this parameter given by Ã1 < ¯
¡1: Thus, I have chosen a value for Ã1 equal to 0:55, together with a
steady state level of public debt to GDP set to 60%.
Finally, the level of the technology shock in the production function has been set in order to match
exactly the mean of US economy in the post-war period.
Two …nal parameters remain to be calibrated. The …rst is the parameter ± which indicates the
fraction of goods supplied, whose price does not change. We know that 0 · ± < 1: I follow Woodford
(1996) and I have set ± = 0:36:
With these parameter, for the model based on the Calvo-Woodford approach I obtain a coe¢cient
on the output gap in the AS function equal to 0.38, which is close to what has been taken as a …xed
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benchmark by Woodford (1996, 2000), based on the estimates of AS proposed by Roberts (1995).
For what concerns the model based on the Cost of Price Adjustment, I set a value for parameter Áp
equal to 0.806, as in Kim (2000).
To complete the calibration issue, we need now to add some considerations on the paraemters of the
shocks hitting the system. I assume the following set of parameters for the Autoregressive processes:
½A = 0:98, ½© = 0:92, ½» = 0:96, ½mp = 0:96, ½T = 0:96. Finally, the variance-covariance matrix of the
shocks is given by:
§" =
2666664
¾2A 0 0 0 0
0 ¾2© 0 0 0
0 0 ¾2» 0 0
0 0 0 ¾2mp 0
0 0 0 0 ¾2T
3777775 =
2666664
0:0003 0 0 0 0
0 0:02 0 0 0
0 0 0:00196 0 0
0 0 0 0:001 0
0 0 0 0 0:0049
3777775
These parameters values were obtained by three sources: Kim (2000), Cooley and Prescott (1995)
and another companion paper by Marzo (2001), with capital accumulation. I assumed a set of shocks
completely orthogonal among them. This assumption represents just a simple working hypothesis.
7 Determinacy of the Equilibrium
This section is intended to extend the discussion on determinacy of the equilibrium in monetary models
to the present framework. In order to focus on the determinacy issue, in what follows I will concentrate
only on the analysis of the model based on the rigidity approach modelled as in the Calvo - Woodford
models. The model with cost of price adjustment can be analyzed in a very similar way.
The goal of the determinacy/indeterminacy analysis is to …nd a set of conditions to be imposed on
the policy parameters of the model in order to satisfy the requirement of determinacy of the equilibrium.
In other words, the goal here is to …nd under which conditions on the monetary policy parameters we
can rule out explosive equilibria.
To highlight the problem I will concentrate on a the simplest Taylor rule for the Calvo-Woodford
model, given by Taylor Rule 1, equation (53). To properly discuss the determinacy/indeterminacy
issues, we need to cast the system in a particular way, as discussed by Bullard and Mitra (2000). To do
so, by using the money demand equation (25) expressed in log-linear way, together with the representative
budget constraint given in equation (26) (also in log-linear form), we can directly solve for ect and emt as
function of eYt, eGt, e»t and eit. Thus, plugging these expressions into Euler equation (24) and rearranging,
we get the following expression for the Euler equation:
eYt+1 ¡ ®g eGt+1 + ®ieit+1 + ®»e»t+1 ¡ ®¼e¼t+1 = eYt ¡ ®g eGt + ®»e»t + °ieit (57)
with the expression of the coe¢cients ®g, ®i, ®», ®¼, °i reported in the appendix together with their
numerical values. Now add and subtract from equation (57) the level of potential output eY Pt to get:eYt+1 ¡ eY Pt+1 ¡ ®g eGt+1 + ®ieit+1 + ®»e»t+1 ¡ ®¼e¼t+1 = eYt ¡ eY Pt ¡ ®g eGt + ®»e»t + °ieit (58)
De…ne now a composite exogenous disturbance given by:
eRnt ´ h³eY Pt ¡ ®g eGt + ®»e»t´¡ ³eY Pt+1 ¡ ®g eGt+1 + ®»e»t+1´i (59)
Equation (59) de…nes the deviations from the so called “Wicksellian natural rate of interest” from the
value consistent with a zero in‡ation rate, as described by Woodford (2000). Note that in the de…nition
of eRnt enter all the exogenous processes of the system. Thus, using the de…nition of output gap given in
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(41) and using the de…nition of natural rate of interest in (59), we have the following expression for the
IS curve:
ext+1 + ®ieit+1 ¡ ®¼e¼t+1 = ext + °ieit ¡ eRnt (60)
In the subsequent analysis, however, I will concentrate only on the dynamical aspects and I will abstract
form the exogenous disturbance term given by (59). Now the system to be considered is formed by the
IS curve (60), the AS curve given in equation (42) and the interest rate rule 1 (from equation (53)). To
reduce further the system we can plug the monetary policy rule into equation (60) and into the Aggregate
Supply curve (42), to get (after rearranging) the following system of equations:
(1 + ®iÁx) ext+1 + (®iÁ¼ ¡ ®¼) e¼t+1 = (1 + °iÁx) ext + °iÁ¼e¼t + eRnt + ¡°i ¡ ®i½mp¢ ´mpt
¯e¼t+1 = (1¡ ´siÁ¼) e¼t ¡ ¡´sy ¡ ´siÁx¢ ext ¡ ´si´mpt
where in (42) I collected the negative sign derived from coe¢cient ´si is negative and in (60) I used the
log-;linear version of the AR(1) representation of the monetary policy shock given in (52).
To study determinacy/indeterminacy it easier to cast the system in the following way:·
(1 + °iÁx) °iÁ¼
¡ ¡´sy ¡ ´siÁx¢ (1 + ´siÁ¼)
¸ · exte¼t
¸
=
·
(1 + ®iÁx) (®iÁ¼ ¡ ®¼)
0 ¯
¸ · ext+1e¼t+1
¸
+ (61)
+
·
1
¡
°i ¡ ®i½mp
¢
0 ¡´si
¸" eRnt
´mpt
#
or:
A0ezt = A1ezt+1 +A2 " eRnt
´mpt
#
(62)
with ezt = [ext; e¼t]0 : To further reduce the system, let us premultiply the matrices of the RHS of (61)-(62)
by the inverse of A0: The key matrix to be employed to study determinacy/indeterminacy is given by:
ª = A¡10 A1 = £
¡1
·
(1 + ®iÁx) (1 + ´siÁ¼) (1 + ´siÁ¼) (®iÁ¼ ¡ ®¼)¡ ¯°iÁ¼¡
´sy ¡ ´siÁx
¢
(1 + ®iÁx)
¡
´sy ¡ ´siÁx
¢
(®iÁ¼ ¡ ®¼) + ¯ (1 + °iÁx)
¸
with
£ ´ (1 + °iÁx) (1 + ´siÁ¼) + °iÁ¼
¡
´sy ¡ ´siÁx
¢
(63)
.Since neither ext nor e¼t are predetermined, the condition for determinacy is that both eigenvalues of ª
lie inside the unit circle. Thus, the su¢cient conditions for determinacy are collected in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Given Á¼ ¸ 0; Áx ¸ 0, under simple contemporaneous data Taylor Rule 1, the su¢cient
conditions for a Rational Expectation Equilibrium to be unique are:
Á¼ >
®¼
°i ¡ ®i
(64)
Áx <
´sy
´si
(65)
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Proof.
The necessary and su¢cient conditions for uniqueness require that both eigenvalues of ¡ lie inside the
unit circle. Thus, the characteristic polynomial of matrix ª is given by ¹2 + q1¹+ q0, where:
q0 ´ det (ª) = ¯ (1 + ®iÁx)
£
q1 ´ ¡
"
(1 + ®iÁx) (1 + ´siÁ¼) + ¯ (1 + °iÁx) +
¡
´sy ¡ ´siÁx
¢
(®iÁ¼ ¡ ®¼)
£
#
with £ de…ned as in (63). Thus, by applying the Schur-Cohn criterion4, we have that the necessary
and su¢cient condition for both eigenvalues of ¡ lies in the unit circle is equivalent to require that the
following two conditions are satis…ed:
(i) jq0j < 1;
(ii) jq1j < 1 + q0;
Condition (i) requires:
¡1 < ¯ (1 + ®iÁx)
(1 + °iÁx) (1 + ´siÁ¼) + °iÁ¼
¡
´sy ¡ ´siÁx
¢ < 1
which can be split up in the following two inequalities:
(1 + °iÁx) (1 + ´siÁ¼) + °iÁ¼
¡
´sy ¡ ´siÁx
¢
> ¯ + ®i¯Áx (66)
¡ (1 + °iÁx) (1 + ´siÁ¼)¡ °iÁ¼
¡
´sy ¡ ´siÁx
¢
< ¯ + ®i¯Áx (67)
From (66) we have that:
Áx (°i ¡ ®i¯) + ´siÁ¼ (1 + °iÁx) + °iÁ¼
¡
´sy ¡ ´siÁx
¢
> ¡ (1¡ ¯)
given the sign of our coe¢cients, the above inequality is certainly veri…ed if
¡
´sy ¡ ´siÁx
¢
> 0, which
implies (65).
The second inequality (67) implies:
(1 + °iÁx) (1 + ´siÁ¼) + °iÁ¼
¡
´sy ¡ ´siÁx
¢
+ ¯ (1 + ®iÁx) > 0
which given (65) is always veri…ed.
Condition (ii) implies the following two inequalities:
£+ ¯ (1 + ®iÁx) + (1 + ®iÁx) (1 + ´siÁ¼) + ¯ (1 + °iÁx) +
¡
´sy ¡ ´siÁx
¢
(®iÁ¼ + ®¼) > 0 (68)
¡£¡ ¯ (1 + ®iÁx) < ¡ (1 + ®iÁx) (1 + ´siÁ¼)¡ ¯ (1 + °iÁx)¡
¡
´sy ¡ ´siÁx
¢
(®iÁ¼ + ®¼) (69)
Inequality (68) is always satis…ed, given (65). From (69) we get after rearranging:
Áx (°i ¡ ®i) (1¡ ¯ + ´siÁ¼) +
¡
´sy ¡ ´siÁx
¢
[(°i ¡ ®i)Á¼ ¡ ®¼] > 0 (70)
Thus, given that Áx ¸ 0, and given that the di¤erence (°i ¡ ®i) is positive5 (see Appendix A.2). Thus,
to satisfy (70) we need:
1¡ ¯ + ´siÁ¼ > 0 (71)
(°i ¡ ®i)Á¼ ¡ ®¼ > 0 (72)
4See LaSalle (1989).
5With the parameter values assumed here, we have that ®i = 0:0277, and °i = 0:0281, so °i ¡ ®i = 0:0004:
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Inequality (71) implies:
Á¼ > ¡
(1¡ ¯)
´si
which is always satis…ed, because ¯ < 1, and ´si > 0 (after having collected the minus sign). Finally,
from (72) we directly get (64). ¥
Basically, the conditions here collected imply two bounds for the two parameters of the monetary
policy function: an upper bound for the coe¢cient on output gap and a lower bound for that on the
in‡ation rate. This means that, in order to achieve stability and determinacy for the Rational Expectation
Equilibrium we need to set high values for Á¼ together with very low values for Áx. This is not in contrast
with what has been considered by Woodford (2000). An analogous set of conditions can be obtained
also for the model with Cost of Price Adjustment.
I considered here conditions for determinacy only for the model including Taylor Rule 1. In fact,
this is because the inclusion of Taylor Rule 1 represents the only case in which we can obtain simple
analytical coniditions to establish determinacy/indeterminacy. The di¢culty here is represented by the
presence of the nominal interest rate in the AS function and in the IS curve dated at time t+ 1. Thus
if we try to analyze the determinacy issues in models with Taylor Rule 2 or 4, as monetary policy rules,
we would get a set of conditionis characterizes by an hihgh level of nonlinearity in the parameter values,
which makes very di¢cult the task of …nding determinacy conditions with a sound economic economic
signi…cance.
As I discussed before, this is a typical characteristic of the model at hand, given the particular way
in which money enters in the utility function. At the contrary, in a model originating from an utility
function with arguments (, L, M/P) strongly separable - given its simplicity - it is not di¢cult to …nd a
full set of conditions of determinacy of the REE for all the policy rules here considered, as documented
by Woodford (2000) and Bullard and Mitra (2000).
8 Optimal Monetary Policy Rule
8.1 Welfare analysis in monetary models
In this section I will discuss the search for an optimal policy rule for the model with Calvo-Woodford
rigidities and the model with Cost of Price adjustment rigidities. The welfare analysis has the goal
of …nding the combination of parameters which maximizes the welfare of the representative agent. In
this case, I am going to follow the same approach highlighted in a long series of well celebrated papers,
started with Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1998, 1999), where the welfare of the representative agent
depends upon both …rst and second order e¤ects. This approach is similar to that adopted by the public
…nance literature where it is customary to compare alternative measures of …scal policy or welfare-oriented
economy.
Second-order e¤ects are crucial in the evaluation of alternative monetary policy rules. In fact, the
volatility of the crucial variables of the system - such as output, output gap, in‡ation and nominal interest
rate - are a critical element in the evaluation of the goodness of a particular monetary policy rule. Under
this respect, as outlined since the pioneering Poole’s (1970) results, a good policy rule is also that which
insulates better the system from a whatsoever kind of shock, by minimizing the ‡uctuations of the variable
of the system from their trend. In the same way, a good policy rule is the rule which induce the minimal
level of volatility in the global economic system.
The approach most widely employed in the evaluation of monetary policy rules takes a second order
Taylor expansion of the utility function of the representative agent. However, this methods has some
subtle limitations which can be safely by-passed by using the utility function here considered.
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To state the problem, consider z as a vector of endogenous variable, and let " be the disturbances to
these variables. Suppose we want to evaluate E [U (x; ")] under alternative policy rules. We can consider
vector z as a set of policy rules relating the endogenous variables to the exogenous shock " derived as
solution of a dynamic macroeconomic model. Suppose now that we can express the relationship between
z and the vector of shock, by using z = f ("). A log-linear approximation of the policy function z can
be described as follows:
z = z0 + f
0
"+ o
³
k"k2
´
(73)
where z0 is at most of order o (k"k). This operation is legitimate because, our welfare calculations have
only local validity, for small deviations of the relevant variables from their steady states induced by shocks
in vector ". A Second-order Taylor expansion of the utility function assumes the following form:
E [U (z; ")] = U +
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where U = U (z; 0) and b" is the deviation from the steady state (which is assumed to be zero for
what concerns ", because I set E (") = 0, V ar (") = §"", matrix of variance-covariance, assumed to be
diagonal6). The problem of second-order accuracy is given by the term underbraced which depends
upon f"", the term neglected in (73). The full accuracy of the second order Taylor expansion would
require that the term underbraced will disappear. This is equivalent to assume that the gradient of
the utility function calculated in the steady state Uz (z; 0) is at most of order o (k"k). According to
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1998, 1999), this is certainly true when we assume an utility function
strongly separable in all its arguments. In the case considered in the present paper, with the utility
function given by (2), the term indicated by F in (74) can be safely neglected in the welfare calculations
without endangering the accuracy of the second order approximation. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997,
1998, 1999) together with Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995, 1997) consider strongly separable utility function
which di¤er from (2) because of the presence of real monetary balances. However, as discussed by Sims
(2000b), this approach is not entirely correct in dynamic models, because it tends to exclude important
complementarities between the argument of the utility function, especially the role between consumption
and leisure.
Under the utility function (2) we get that a second-order Taylor expansion would result in:
U(C;L) = U(C;L) +C
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where eCt, and eLt are the solutions in loglinear forms of the dynamical system, and represent the policy
function as z = f ("). The inclusion of the solution of the dynamical system into (74) or (75) can be
safely done just because of the particular type of utility function here assumed.
8.2 Optimal Monetary Policy Rule for the Calvo-Woodford model
In what follows I report the welfare results for various con…guration of parameters for the monetary
model based on the Calvo-Woodford approach. The simulations reported in this case and for the case
with price adjustment cost function, are obtained by simulating the model in quarterly frequency. Each
simulated time series is obtained after having performed 1000 simulations of the model, from which I
discarded the …rst and the last 100 simulations. All the simulations have been obtained for each values
of the monetary policy parameters in the intervals (Á¼; Áx; Ái) 2 [0; 20] with step 0.01. The volatility
6All the shocks are assumed to be incorrelated.
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results have been obtained according to the above described method for each values of the parameter of
monetary policy function. The arti…cial time series were passed by the Hodrik-Prescott …lter.
By adopting the methodology described before, we can collect a synthesis of the results in Table 2.
Rule Á¼ Áx Ái ¾2¼ ¾2y ¾2i ¾
2
x U
a1 1.71 0.08 0 2.78 4.21 5.23 11.43 6.5
a2 10 0.08 0 1.32 8.4 6.8 15.24 6.12
a3 1.71 10 0 1.15 3.89 8.12 10.45 6.9
b1 1.48 0.06 1.25 2.95 5.56 4.99 10.92 7.28
b2 10 0.06 1.25 2.0 7.12 5.4 14.35 6.22
b3 1.48 10 1.25 2.05 3.8 6.56 9.77 5.95
b4 1.48 0.06 10 2.12 5.14 4.85 15.22 6.88
c1 1.3 0.063 1.7 1.91 4.25 5.44 10.71 7.1
c2 10 0.063 1.7 1.5 5.3 7.23 11.52 6.97
c3 1.3 10 1.7 2.15 2.6 8.41 12.8 7.0
c4 1.3 0.063 10 1.33 2.42 4.38 7.4 7.25
d1 1.42 0.04 1.75 1.85 4.17 5.21 10.5 7.18
d2 10 0.04 1.75 1.22 4.32 5.86 11.7 7.1
d3 1.42 10 1.75 1.78 2.7 6.95 12.8 7.21
d4 1.42 0.04 10 1.81 2.6 4.1 15.21 7.05
US historical – – – 2.28 4.79 7.64 12.14 7.52
Table 2: Model with rigidities à la Calvo-Woodford
Note that the rule indicated with “a” refer to di¤erent parameters combination for Taylor Rule 1,
while those indicated by “b”, “c” and “d”, refer to Taylor Rule 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
From the results reported in Table 2, we …nd that the optimal policy rule is given by Rule b1. In
fact, in the Calvo-Woodford framework, Taylor Rule 2 with Á¼ = 1:4, Áx = 0:06, and Ái = 1:25 delivers
the best results in terms of welfare of the representative agent. By going through the numbers of Table
1, we also get that the rules belonging to group d produce results very close to this optimal one, in terms
of welfare. Moreover, it is possible to note a simple result: by raising the coe¢cient Á¼ describing
the reaction of monetary authority to the in‡ation rate, we get a marked reduction of the in‡ation rate,
wihout necessarily implying a welfare increase. In fact, by considering rules belonging to group “a”, we
observe that if we raise Á¼ from 1.71 to 10 (i.e. passing from rule a1 to a2), we get a marked reduction of
the volatility of the in‡ation rate, but at the expenses of an increased volatility in the output gap, output
and nominal interest rate. The same is true when we move from Rule b1 to b2, from c1 to c2, and from
d1 to d2, though in this last case, the increase in the volatility is lower than what has been recorded in
all previous cases. This is a consequence of the fact that the welfare criterion of the representative agent
is decreasing in the volatility of both in‡ation and output gap: by raising the tightness on the in‡ation
rate, we also raise the volatility of output and nominal interest rate.
The results here outlined are close to what has been obtained by the existing literature - in particular
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) - but with some additional remarks. First of all, the values of the
optimal monetary policy here obtained are slightly higher than what has been obtained by Rotemberg
and Woodford, who considers as benchmark values Á¼ = 1:4, Áx = 0:06, and Ái = 1:25. However, if the
nominal rigidities are designed according to the Calvo-Woodford method, the optimal monetary policy
rules the optimal monetary policy rule is the same as in Rotemberg and Woodford, con…rming their claim
that the presence of expectation in a monetary policy function is not crucial.
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To have a better idea of the empirical performance of the model, let us consider the plot of some
time series simulated from the model versus the historical corresponding variables for the US economy.
This procedure has been considered by several authors as a complementary method of model evaluation
together with the second moment calculations. Therefore, to see how the choice of monetary policy rules
a¤ects the …t of the model in Figure 1 and 2 I reported the plot of the in‡ation rate, nominal interest
rate and output simulated from the model together the correspondent time series for the US economy
(quarterly observations, sample 1974:1-1994:4). All the variables were passed with the Hodrik-Prescott
…lter. For all the pictures, the dark line is the actual time series (from the data of US economy), while
the dashed line is the simulated time series. All the time series were obtained by simulating the model
1000 times discarding the …rst and the last 100 simulations.
In Figure 1, I report the simulation results for the model simulated with Taylor Rule 1, with the
combination of parameters given by a1 in Table 2. From the top panel reported in Figure 1, we observe
that the time series of the in‡ation of the model appears to underestimate the in‡ation rate: the dashed
curve for the in‡ation rate stays always below that of the in‡ation from the US economy. Additionally,
with this monetary policy rule, we not a volatility of the nominal interest rate much higher than is
displayed from the actual time series. At the same time, in the bottom panel, we observe that the
simulated time series of output is too smooth, if compared with the actual time series of the model, and
does not seem to capture the various peaks and throughs occurred in the sale period under exam in the
US economy.
However, the adoption of an interest rate pegging rule with the lagged nominal interest rate included
- like Taylor Rule 2 - show a considerable improvement in …t of the model with the actual data. This is
revealed by the plots reported in Figure 2, where I reported the actual time series versus the simulated
time series for in‡ation, nominal interest rate and output when the model is simulated with a con…guration
of parameters given by b1 in Table 2. In this case, in fact, the in‡ation rate is not underestimated, even
if does not seem to be able to capture completely the various peaks and through displayed by the actual
time series. In any case, however, the time series here reported for the simulated in‡ation seems to
capture quite well the trend of the in‡ation rate. Also, the pattern of the nominal interest rate seems
to con…rm the improved performance of the model. However the time series here reported for output
seems again to appear too smoothed with respect to the actual time series. However, the simulated
series captures quite well the overall trend and some ‡uctuations observed in real data.
In any case, it is evident that the adoption of a rule with a lagged interest rate displays a better …t
of the model. This can be also taken as additional element in favor of Taylor Rule 2 for a model when
nominal rigidities are modelled along the Calvo-Woodford approach.
8.3 Optimal Monetary Policy Rule for Price Adjustment Cost model
To detect the di¤erences among the various models characterized by di¤erent monetary policy rules, I
will report the same kind of simulations for the model with the Cost of Price Adjustment Rules. As in
the case with the Calvo-Woodford nominal rigidity design, each monetary policy parameter varies in the
interval (Á¼; Áx; Ái) 2 [0; 20] with step equal to 0.01. For each parameter value I calculated the second
moments by simulating the model 1000 times, discarding the …rst 100 and the second 100 simulations.
The results are displayed in Table 3.
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Rule Á¼ Áx Ái ¾
2
¼ ¾
2
y ¾
2
i ¾
2
x U
A1 1.66 0.02 0 2.9 5.61 9.1 15.21 6.51
A2 10 0.02 0 1.8 4.82 10.2 13.56 6.95
A3 1.66 10 0 2.12 2.25 9.45 7.88 6.87
B1 1.75 0.03 1.5 2.33 4.95 4.71 10.23 7.22
B2 10 0.03 1.5 1.95 6.28 6.68 14.3 7.34
B3 1.75 10 1.5 2.01 4.68 5.31 10.15 6.95
B4 1.75 0.03 10 1.25 5.77 6.15 12.43 7.09
C1 1.6 0.03 1.3 3.2 4.99 7.85 13.78 6.92
C2 10 0.03 1.3 1.98 5.61 8.6 16.51 6.85
C3 1.6 10 1.3 3.31 2.1 9.77 7.21 6.9
C4 1.6 0.03 10 2.34 3.8 3.5 9.75 7.05
D1 1.88 0.06 1.65 2.25 4.85 7.22 12.21 7.85
D2 10 0.06 1.65 1.45 5.01 8.1 13.5 7.55
D3 1.88 10 1.65 2.32 3.9 9.3 11.63 7.2
D4 1.88 0.06 10 1.51 4.0 4.1 10.59 7.45
US historical – – – 2.28 4.79 7.64 12.14 7.52
Table 3: Model with rigidities Cost of Price Adjustment
By going through the numbers reported in the Table 3 we …nd that the policy rules which assures the
best result in terms of welfare is given by D1, which corresponds to Taylor Rule 4 with an expectational
term and a lagged nominal interest rate. This is a di¤erent result from what has been obtained in the
previous case, in a model with nominal rigidities designed according to the Calvo-Woodford method of
price adjustment function.
The optimality of Rule 4 in the model with price adjustment costs, is similar to what has been
obtained by Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1999) in a celebrated paper. One possible explanation could
probably consider the role of expectations form the private sector in the design of the optimal monetary
policy. In fact, as I have shown before, the mechanics behind the method price adjustment cost function
reveals a fully microfounded nominal rigidity approach, where agents make their plans in terms of optimal
pricing by looking at the future path of the economy, immediately after a shock. In fact, the cost of
price adjustment function (43) is included in fully perfectly optimizing model where the single agent
takes into account the future path of prices and expected in‡ation. Thus, the inclusion of the expected
in‡ation rate in the monetary policy function, is a way to keep up with the in‡ationary expectations
coming from the private sector, from the monetary authority’s point of view. A similar explanation
for the optimality of a monetary policy rule targeting the expected in‡ation term has been provided by
Evans and Honkapohja (2000), though in a di¤erent paper. They show, in fact that by including the
expected in‡ation in the monetary policy function increases the region of parameters for which we get
full determinacy of the Rational Expectation equilibrium.
As for the model with the Calvo-Woodford approach for modelling nominal rigidities, I consider in
Figure 3 and 4 the goodness of …t for the model with cost of price adjustment. Even in this case, the
dark lines represent the actual paths for the time series of in‡ation, nominal interest rate and output for
the US economy in the sample 1974:1-1994:4, quarterly observations, while the dashed lines indicate the
simulated time series, obtained after having simulated the model 1000 times and after having discarded
the …rst and the last 100 observations. Thus, by looking at …gure 3, where I reported the plot for actual
vs. simulated paths when the model includes a simple contemporaneous data Taylor Rule such as Rule 1,
with the parameter con…guration given by rule A1 in Table 3. In this case, it is easy to note that a model
like this does not …t well US data in the sample 1974:1-1994:4. Even if the in‡ation rate captures quite
well the underlying trend, the same cannot be said for both nominal interest rate and output. In fact,
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by considering the middle and the bottom panel reported in Figure 3, we observe that the dashed lines
(the simulated time series) do not capture at all the pattern of the observed time series. In particular,
the nominal interest rate is highly volatile and underestimated with respect to the actual time series, and
output appears to be too smoothed if compared to the original time series.
Let us consider now Figure 4, where I reported the simulated vs. actual time series for the model
with a monetary policy rule such as rule 4 with the parameter con…guration corresponding to the optimal
monetary rule, as represented in rule D1. By looking at the panels reported in …gure 4, we observe that
a monetary policy rule with an expected in‡ation rate, like Rule 4, is shows a better …t than the previous
case. In fact, both the in‡ation and nominal interest rate show a trend perfectly in accord with the
actual time series, though not all the various peaks and throughs observed in the reality are recorded
by the simulated time series. The bottom panel of Figure 4, shows a pattern of output quite volatile,
though on the average trend. In any case, Rule 4 seems to o¤er a better …t of the model, than the case
represented by Rule 1, con…rming the results obtained through the welfare analysis.
9 Impulse-Response Analysis
In this section I am going to consider some policy experiments to examine the dynamic response pattern
of the main variables of the system. In each case we will simulate the response of each single variables
for di¤erent values of the parameters of the monetary policy function which turned out to be optimal
in each type of model according to the welfare results previously discussed. This example is illustrative
of how the magnitude of the parameter can a¤ect the pattern of response of each variables. Let us
start with an expansionary government expenditure shock. A contractionary monetary policy shock will
follow. For all the policy experiments here considered I assume that …scal policy is ‘Ricardian’, in the
sense described by Woodford (1996, 2000): taxes are set to react proportionately to the stock of real
debt. To accomplish this I have set the value of the parameter of the …scal policy reaction function equal
to Ã1 = 0:55:
9.1 A Government Expenditure Shock
9.1.1 Calvo-Woodford model
In …gure 5 the left column represents the dynamic response of y C, i, ¼ and b (real public debt) after a
one percent shock to government expenditure, for di¤erent values of the parameter Á¼, of Taylor Rule 2.
The right column indicates dynamic response patterns for di¤erent values of the parameters describing
the tightness on the output gap Áx, and the last column depicts the impulse-response patterns for changes
in the parameter Ái. In all cases, the dark line represents what I call the ‘benchmark’ case, i.e. the
response patterns designed for the parameters of the optimal monetary policy rules considered for this
model, which, according to the results considered in the previous section, is given by Rule 2. In this
case, we know that the optimal rule is given by the parameter combination given by Rule b1 reported in
Table 2, so that the dark line is obtained when Á¼ = 1:48, Áx = 0:06, and Ái = 1:25.
Let us look at the …rst column to the left. The dotted line is the response pattern when Á¼ = 10,
Áx = 0:06, Ái = 1:25 while the dashed line is when Á¼ = 20, Áx = 0:06; Ái = 1:25. After an expansionary
…scal policy shock, we observe a strong impact on aggregate output: the higher demand from the public
sector stimulates the production of more goods. The increase of aggregate demand translates into
an higher level of disposable income, determining a very persistent increase of the consumption level.
However, these increments of aggregate demand are in‡ationary: monetary authority reacts by raising
the nominal interest rate to contrast the in‡ationary pressure and the increase of actual output with
respect to the potential output. Real public debt increases for two reasons: the increase of public
expenditure - not accompanied by an exact equal increase in the …scal revenue (at least in the impact
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period) - creates the needs for the government to …nance the new expenditure by issuing new amount
of debt. Secondly, the rise of nominal interest rate, due to the non-accommodating reaction from the
monetary policy side, increases the burden of interest payments.
In any case, the raise of the in‡ation rate does not mitigate these e¤ects on the level of real public debt
b. However, it should be noted that the increase of the public debt dies out in the long run, because I
assumed a Ricardian Fiscal Policy rule. This ensures a full recovering from the initial public expenditure
shock, eliminating in this way the possibility of getting an in‡ationary equilibrium through the increase
of the burden of public debt and the increase of the probability of government default.
Similar e¤ects can be read in the middle column of Figure 5 where I reported the impulse responses for
di¤erent values of the parameter Áx. The dark line still represents the case with Á¼ = 1:48, Áx = 0:06,
and Ái = 1:25, the dotted line indicates Á¼ = 1:48, Áx = 10, and Ái = 1:25, while the dashed line
depicts the case Á¼ = 1:48, Áx = 20, and Ái = 1:25. The similarity of the response patterns indicates
the fact that raising parameter Áx produces similar e¤ects on the response patterns of almost all the
variables: this con…rms the results obtained by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), by which raising Á¼
or Áx produces almost the same e¤ect on the response pattern of the various variables of the system.
If we increase the magnitude of all the parameters of the monetary policy function in turn, we increase
the ability from the monetary authority in controlling the ‡uctuations of all variables. In particular, when
Á¼ is very high (say 10 or 20), we need a small change in the nominal interest rate to produce a persistent
de‡ationary phenomena. Thus, the adoption of monetary policy rules with a strong commitment on
the in‡ation rat target, will produce a good stabilizing e¤ect on the variables of the system around their
steady state. Therefore, a very high value for Á¼ and Áx will imply a reduction of the volatility of all
variables after a destabilizing shock hitting the economy.
Note also that all the Impulse-Response functions were drawn by raising the value of various coe¢-
cients in the monetary policy function, each by taking the value of all the other coe¢cients equal to their
optimal value. This is done in order to preserve the determinacy property of the Rational Expectation
equilibrium.
9.1.2 Cost of Price Adjustment
In Figure 6 I reported the impulse response functions after an expansionary policy shock in the model
with cost of price adjustment. Recall that in this case the welfare analysis revealed that the optimal
policy rule is given by Rule 4, i.e., the rule with a target on the expected in‡ation rate. As before,
the dark lines in all the pictures belonging to Figure 6 represent the benchmark case, i.e. the parameter
con…guration for monetary policy rule 4 with expected in‡ation corresponding to the welfare maximizing
case, indicated by the parameter con…guration D1 in Table 3. Thus, in the left column of Figure 6
I reported the pictures for changes in the parameter Á¼: the dark line is for Á¼ = 1:88, Áx = 0:06,
Ái = 1:65, the dotted line is for Á¼ = 10, Áx = 0:06, Ái = 1:65 and the dashed line is for Á¼ = 20,
Áx = 0:06, Ái = 1:65. The middle column considers the variations in parameter Áx: the dark line is
again for Á¼ = 1:88, Áx = 0:06, Ái = 1:65, the dotted line is for Á¼ = 1:88, Áx = 10, Ái = 1:65 and
the dashed line is for Á¼ = 1:88, Áx = 20, Ái = 1:65. Finally, the right column indicates the impulse
responses for changes in the parameter values of Ái: the dark line is again for Á¼ = 1:88, Áx = 0:06,
Ái = 1:65, the dotted line is for Á¼ = 1:88, Áx = 0:06, Ái = 10 and the dashed line is for Á¼ = 1:88,
Áx = 0:06, Ái = 20:
By looking at the pictures reported in Figure 6 we note several similarities in the dynamic response
of each variable to the responses derived from the model with Calvo-Woodford nominal rigidities. It is
not di¢cult to note a better persistence of the in‡ation rate after the expansionary …scal policy shock.
The most important similarities can be found in the behavior of the variables following changes in the
parameters of the monetary policy function: a more aggressive monetary policy towards the in‡ation
(higher Á¼) will minimize the ‡uctuations of all the variables around their steady states, improving the
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ability of monetary authority in stabilizing the system. The same is true also for the increase of the
values of parameters Áx, Ái. Remarkably, the signs of impulse-response functions are the same as those
considered for the model with the Calvo-Woodford mechanism of price adjustment.
9.2 A Contractionary Monetary Shock
In what follows I consider another policy exercise represented by a contractionary monetary policy shock
realized through an unexpected increase of nominal interest rate. The results are collected in Figures 7
and 8. As for the case with an expansionary public expenditure shock, the impulse-response functions are
considered by changing the parameter values one per time, in order to preserve stability of the Rational
Expectation Equilibrium, along the lines proposed by Woodford (2000) and Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999).
9.2.1 Calvo-Woodford model
The impulse response functions for such type of exercise are reported in Figure 7, for the Calvo-Woodford
model with Taylor Rule 2. The meaning of the various lines denomination are exactly the same as those
we have discussed before. The impact of a monetary policy contraction through the increase of the
nominal interest rate, generates a recessionary e¤ect observed in the strong negative impact on all the
variables of the system (both nominal and real). Like for the expansionary …scal policy shock, the various
e¤ects determined by monetary policy shocks can be interpreted along the lines of a simple IS-LM model
textbook based level. Thus, if we concentrate on the dark line, which still represents the model with
the parameters for the optimal monetary policy rule, we observe that after the contractionary monetary
shock (through the increase of the nominal interest rate), we observe a strong negative impact on output,
consumption, and a marked reduction of the in‡ation rate. Together with this, we observe a sharp
increase in the level of the real debt, caused by the increase in the burden of interest payment due to the
increase of the interest rate.
Compared with the increase of public debt observed in Figures 5 and 6, here we note a much lower
persistence for the recovering of public debt towards the equilibrium.
If we look at the e¤ects of changing the parameters of the Taylor Rule 2 here adopted, we do not
observe signi…cant di¤erences with the previous case. Higher are the parameters values, slower will be
the ‡uctuations of the variables. Thus, even in this case we observe the stabilization property assigned to
he monetary policy function. Similar results are obtained also for changes in the persistence parameter
Ái; whose results are reported in the right column of Figure 7.
9.2.2 Cost of Price Adjustment
Figure 8 collects the impulse response functions for this type of model, where the optimal monetary policy
rule is given by Taylor Rule 4 (see equation (56)), with a target on the expected in‡ation and a lagged
interest rate. For the model where nominal rigidities are modelled through the price adjustment costs à
la Rotemberg (1982), we …nd a set of results not too dissimilar from those reported in Figure 7 for the
model with Calvo-Woodford price rigidities.
Even in this case, the contractionary monetary policy shock substantiates into a marked and persistent
increase of the nominal interest rate, which causes the recessionary e¤ect on the economy: output,
consumption and in‡ation decline. Real debt increases because of the increased cost of paying the
burden of interest payment, and because of the reduced in‡aiton rate. It is worth to note that this
case shows a much higher persistence of the various responses of the variables, after the monetary policy
shock. In particular, in‡ation shows an higher level of persistence, together with output and real debt (as
a consequence of the persistence in the reduction of the in‡ation rate). The persistence showed by these
variables is an argument in favor of modelling nominal rigidities by using the cost of price adjustment
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approach, given the lack of internal propagation mechanism deriving from the simple monetary business
cycle with Calvo-Woodford approach. Another element which is worth to note is the strong e¤ects
generated by monetary policy: after a contractionary monetary shock all the variables show signi…cant
‡uctuations.
The changes of the parameter values produce similar e¤ects as those displayed by the model with
Calvo-Woodford approach. Thus, even in this case, by increasing the magnitude of the parameters of
the monetary policy function helps to minimize the ‡uctuations of the variables of he system around
their trend.
10 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I compared the search for an optimal policy rules for two distinct models, in order to detect
if the way by which nominal rigidities enter in the model makes a signi…cant di¤erence. The models
under comparison where two simple monetary RBC models without capital accumulation: the …rst
models nominal rigidities through the Calvo (1983) mechanism of price adjustment, where the revision
of the …nal good price is exogenously given by a …xed fraction of …rms populating the economy. In other
words, in each period prices are changed through …xed intervals, exogenously given. The second model
consider the nominal rigidities through the presence of quadratic price adjustment costs, along the lines
proposed by Rotemberg (1982). Both models share a similar structure of the economy: money enters
via transaction costs in the Representative agent’s budget constraint, the production function includes a
…xed cost component interpreted as a business set up cost. Both models contain several features which
makes the natural level of output ine¢cient. Additionally, according to the recent contribution by Fiscal
Theory of the Price Level, I assume a …scal policy con…guration de…ned ‘Ricardian’ or ‘Passive’.
Withe these features at hand, the results from model simulations show that the choice of the modelling
nominal rigidities is not indi¤erent to the determination of the optimal monetary policy rule: with
rigidities modelled à la Calvo (1983), the optimal monetary policy rule turns out to be an interest rate
pegging rule with contemporaneous in‡ation and output gap target together with a lagged interest rate to
account for the persistency on nominal interest rate. However, in the model with cost of price adjustment,
the optimal monetary policy rule is identi…ed with an interest rate pegging rule whose argument are the
expected in‡ation a contemporaneous level of the output gap and a lagged nominal interest rate. The
optimality result is obtained through a grid search for the con…guration of parameters which maximizes
the utility of the representative agent, along the lines recently discussed by Woodford (2000) and Sims
(2000). Various impulse responses of the main variables of the system are showed for di¤erent values of
the parameters of the monetary policy function when the economy is hit by two types of shocks: and
expansionary …scal policy shock ad a contractionary monetary policy shock.
Overall, the method based on the price adjustment cost seems to guarantee better results also in terms
of a better internal propagation mechanism of the model. These results for the …rst time show a critical
comparison of the two method of modelling rigidities, and represent a step ahead towards the de…nition of
the elements of a well established microfounded model to be used as a benchmark in comparative policy
evaluation.
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Appendix
Coe¢cients for equation (57)
®g =
´cg
´cy
®i =
´mi (´c¸´cm ¡ ´m¸)
´cy (´m¸ ¡ ´c¸)
®» =
´c¸´cm ¡ ´m¸ [2 (1¡ ´cm)¡ 1]
´cy (´m¸ ¡ ´c¸)
®¼ =
(1¡ ´cm)
´cy (´m¸ ¡ ´c¸)
°i =
´mi [´c¸´cm ¡ ´m¸ ¡ 2´mi (1¡ ´cm)]
´cy (´m¸ ¡ ´c¸)
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